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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, crowd sensing becomes increasingly more popu-
lar due to the ubiquitous usage of mobile devices. However,
the quality of such human-generated sensory data varies
significantly among different users. To better utilize sen-
sory data, the problem of truth discovery, whose goal is to
estimate user quality and infer reliable aggregated results
through quality-aware data aggregation, has emerged as a
hot topic. Although the existing truth discovery approaches
can provide reliable aggregated results, they fail to protect
the private information of individual users. Moreover, crowd
sensing systems typically involve a large number of partic-
ipants, making encryption or secure multi-party computa-
tion based solutions difficult to deploy. To address these
challenges, in this paper, we propose an efficient privacy-
preserving truth discovery mechanism with theoretical guar-
antees of both utility and privacy. The key idea of the pro-
posed mechanism is to perturb data from each user inde-
pendently and then conduct weighted aggregation among
users’ perturbed data. The proposed approach is able to
assign user weights based on information quality, and thus
the aggregated results will not deviate much from the true
results even when large noise is added. We adapt local dif-
ferential privacy definition to this privacy-preserving task
and demonstrate the proposed mechanism can satisfy local
differential privacy while preserving high aggregation accu-
racy. We formally quantify utility and privacy trade-off and
further verify the claim by experiments on both synthetic
data and a real-world crowd sensing system.
1. INTRODUCTION
∗This work was done when the authors Yaliang Li, Houping
Xiao and Zhan Qin were at State University of New York at
Buffalo.
Today, we witness the explosion of sensory data which are
continuously generated by countless individuals all over the
world through the increasingly capable and affordable mo-
bile devices, such as smartphones, smartwatches, and smart-
glasses. The information mined from such massive human-
generated sensory data provides critical insights for a wide
spectrum of applications, including healthcare, smart trans-
portation and many others. While sensory data are poten-
tially huge treasure troves, it remains a challenging task to
extract truthful information from the noisy, conflicting and
heterogeneous data submitted by the numerous mobile de-
vice users.
In such scenarios, it is essential to aggregate the sensory
data about the same set of objects collected from a crowd of
users to get true facts or aggregated results. The key factor
in aggregating noisy sensory data is to capture the differ-
ence in information quality among different users. Some
users provide correct and useful information while others
may submit noisy or fake information due to hardware qual-
ity, environment noise, or even the intent to deceive and get
rewards. Therefore, the naive approach that regards all the
users equally in aggregation may fail to derive reliable aggre-
gated results. Instead, we hope to capture the probability
of a user providing accurate information in the form of user
weight and incorporate it into the aggregation so that fi-
nal output is closer to the information provided by reliable
users. The challenge is that user weight is usually unknown
a priori in practice and has to be inferred from the sensory
data.
To address this challenge, a series of truth discovery mech-
anisms [35, 20, 22] are proposed to tackle the problem of
estimating user weight and inferring reliable aggregated in-
formation from noisy crowdsourced sensory data, and have
been successfully applied to various domains such as social
sensing [32], air quality monitoring [25], and network qual-
ity measurement [21]. In these applications, users can share
their sensory data, and an accurate aggregation can lead to
important knowledge for various applications and systems.
As both user weights and aggregated results are unknown,
truth discovery approaches estimate them simultaneously
based on the following two principles: (1) If the information
provided by a particular user is closer to the aggregated re-
sults, this user will be assigned a higher weight. (2) If a user
has a higher weight, his information will be counted more
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in the aggregation. Based on these principles, truth dis-
covery approaches take crowdsourced sensory data as input,
and then iteratively estimate user weights and update ag-
gregated results. Different from simple aggregation such as
averaging or voting, truth discovery conducts weighted ag-
gregation in which user weights are automatically estimated
from the sensory data.
Privacy Concerns. One important component missing
in these truth discovery approaches is the protection of user
privacy. These approaches assume that the sensory data has
been collected from users by a centralized server. However,
during this data collection procedure, users may have con-
cerns in sharing personal or sensitive information [10, 13, 17,
30, 1, 5, 29, 34]. For example, individuals’ GPS data are im-
portant sources for traffic monitoring and smart transporta-
tion, but contain sensitive information that users might not
want to release. Aggregating health data through wearable
devices can lead to better discovery of new drugs’ effects, but
it may suffer from the risk of information leaking about each
participant. In these and many more application scenarios,
the final aggregation results can be public and beneficial to
the community or society, but the data from each individual
user should be well protected.
A possible solution to tackle this challenge is to adopt
encryption or secure multi-party computation techniques
in truth discovery [26, 27, 41, 40]. However, these tech-
niques typically involve time-consuming computation or ex-
pensive communication among mobile device users. There-
fore, although these techniques can achieve strong protec-
tion for users, it is difficult to deploy them in large-scale
truth discovery tasks which require highly efficient and non-
coordinated privacy preserving strategies.
Proposed Mechanism. In the light of these challenges,
we propose to address such user privacy concerns in truth
discovery by providing an effective and efficient mechanism.
The proposed privacy-preserving truth discovery mechanism
for aggregating sensory data can guarantee both good util-
ity and strong privacy. The proposed mechanism works as
follows. Each user samples independent noise from a pri-
vately known noise distribution and adds the sampled noise
to their data. After collecting perturbed data from all the
users, the server conducts weighted aggregation by weighing
each user’s information properly to obtain final output. We
demonstrate the ability of the proposed mechanism to toler-
ate high noise with negligible loss in aggregation accuracy.
This advantage is brought by the fact that the proposed
mechanism can automatically adjust user weights, and thus
can lower a user’s weight when high noise is added so that
the effect of noise on the final aggregation results can be
significantly reduced.
The theoretical analysis of the proposed mechanism is
conducted from the following aspects: (1) We quantify the
loss in aggregation accuracy that is caused by the noise
added to the input data, and show the proposed mecha-
nism’s advantage that the accuracy does not drop much even
with large noise. (2) Another advantage of the mechanism is
that the noise distribution adopted by each user is unknown
to the public. This scheme is easy to implement and re-
quires no communication among users. Formally, we adopt
local differential privacy to quantify user privacy protection
in truth discovery scenarios. (3) The trade-off between ag-
gregation accuracy (utility) and the defined local differen-
tial privacy is analyzed, which shows how both aggregation
accuracy and end user privacy can be guaranteed simulta-
neously.
Contributions. In summary, our contributions are:
• We propose a privacy-preserving truth discovery mech-
anism for crowdsourced sensory data aggregation,
which consists of perturbations on users’ data and
weighted aggregation on perturbed data. The pro-
posed mechanism tackles this challenging privacy pre-
serving task with guarantees of both accuracy and pri-
vacy.
• We formally define aggregation accuracy and privacy
for the studied task, and theoretically quantify the
range of noise that can be adopted to achieve good
utility and strong privacy.
• Experiments on both synthetic data and a real-crowd
sensing system validate the claim that the proposed
mechanism can generate accurate aggregation results
while preserving users’ privacy. Results show that even
when the added noise is large, aggregation accuracy
only drops slightly.
In the remaining parts of this paper, we first define the
problem in Section 2. Then the proposed privacy-preserving
truth discovery mechanism is presented in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 theoretically analyzes the utility and privacy trade-off,
which is also demonstrated through a series of experiments
in Section 5. We discuss related work in Section 6 and con-
clude the paper in Section 7.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we describe the setting of the proposed
privacy preserving task based on crowd sensing system. At
the core, it consists of two parties: server and users. The
server is a data collector and computation platform, which
is used to collect and aggregate sensory data from a crowd
of users. Users represent the participants of the task, who
are usually driven by their interests or financial incentives.
They receive assigned tasks from the server and submit their
sensory data to the server.
We propose to protect users’ privacy in the sense that
users’ data are obfuscated before being submitted to the
untrusted server. Providing privacy protection for the users
who submit data to an untrusted server is essential in crowd
sensing system. With an effective privacy protection mech-
anism, users are more confident and willing to share data,
which greatly enhances data collection and enables crowd
sensing tasks that would otherwise be infeasible due to pri-
vacy concerns.
The security threats in the crowd sensing system mainly
come from the unfaithful behavior of the server as it can
tamper the confidentiality of users’ provided information.
The server might try to deduce extra knowledge about users
due to curiosity or financial incentives. The users’ security
concern is to protect their private sensory data from leaking
out, while enabling the server to execute aggregation over
them. The formal definition is introduced below.
Problem Definition. Suppose there are N objects (i.e.,
micro-tasks) that the server wants to collect information
about, and there are S users to provide information about
these objects. Let continuous data xsn represent the informa-
tion for the n-th object provided by the s-th user. Instead
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of submitting their original data {xsn}N,Sn,s=1 to the server,
each user perturbs his data and only the perturbed data
{xˆsn}N,Sn,s=1 are submitted. Our goal is to protect users’ pri-
vacy by making the probability of observing the same per-
turbed value given different original values P (xˆ1 = xˆ2|x1 6=
x2) high, while keeping the aggregation on {xˆsn}N,Sn,s=1 close
enough to the true aggregated values. Figure 1 illustrates
this task setting.
Figure 1: Privacy-Preserving Truth Discovery
Note that there are certainly other security threats com-
ing from inside or outside of crowd sensing systems. For the
other threats, we can leverage and integrate existing tech-
niques to make our model more complete and readily being
deployed in real world systems.
3. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first introduce the concepts of truth
discovery, and then present the proposed privacy-preserving
truth discovery mechanism that can guarantee both good
utility and strong privacy.
3.1 Truth Discovery
In crowd sensing systems, multiple observations are pro-
vided by different users on the same set of objects. However,
the quality of user-provided information usually varies a lot
across users. Therefore, the naive approach that treats all
the users equally in aggregation may fail to give reliable ag-
gregated results. Truth discovery [35, 20, 22] gains increas-
ing popularity recently as it can infer user weights and con-
duct weighted aggregation on multiple noisy data sources.
Instead of regarding all the users equally, truth discovery ap-
proaches estimate users’ information quality from the data
and relies more on the users who contribute high-quality
information to derive aggregated results.
Although existing truth discovery approaches may differ
in the specific ways to compute aggregated results and user
weights, we summarize their common procedure as follows.
As there are S users providing their information, the goal
is to aggregate {xsn}Ss=1 to infer the reliable information
about the n-th object, x∗n. Note that we assume both input
and output are continuous values. The general procedure of
truth discovery is summarized in Algorithm 1. Truth dis-
covery starts with an initialization of user weights, and then
iteratively conducts aggregation step and weight estimation
step until convergence. The convergence criterion can be
a threshold for the change of the aggregated results in two
consecutive iterations or a predefined iteration number.
Algorithm 1 Truth Discovery
Input: Information from S users {xsn}N,Sn,s=1.
Output: Aggregated results {x∗n}Nn=1.
1: Initialize the user weights {ws}Ss=1;
2: repeat
3: for i ← 1 to N do
4: According to Eq. (1), update aggregated results based
on the current estimation of user weights;
5: end for
6: According to Eq. (2), estimate user weights based on the
current aggregated results;
7: until Convergence criterion is satisfied;
8: return Aggregated results {x∗n}Nn=1.
Aggregation. In the aggregation step, the user weights are
fixed. Then we infer aggregated results as follows:
x∗n =
∑S
s=1 ws · xsn∑S
s=1 ws
, (1)
where ws is the weight of the s-th user. In this weighted
aggregation framework, the final result x∗n relies on those
users who have high weights. This follows the principle that
the information from reliable users will be counted more.
Weight Estimation. In this step, user weights are inferred
based on the current aggregated results. The basic idea
is that if a user provides information which is close to the
aggregated results, a high weight will be assigned to this
user. Typically, user weights are calculated as follows:
ws = f
(
N∑
n=1
d(xsn, x
∗
n)
)
, (2)
where d(·) is a function that measures the difference between
the user-provided information and the aggregated results,
and f is a monotonically decreasing function. If the differ-
ence is small, then the user gets a high weight. Different
truth discovery methods may adopt various functions d(·)
and f , but the underlying principle is the same.
Here we show the weight estimation of CRH [19] as an
instantiation of Eq. (2):
ws = − log
( ∑N
n=1 d(x
s
n, x
∗
n)∑S
s′=1
∑N
n=1 d(x
s′
n , x∗n)
)
. (3)
Note that the proposed privacy preserving mechanism is not
specifically designed for CRH. It can work with any truth
discovery method that can handle continuous data. In Sec-
tion 5, we will demonstrate experimental results that sup-
port this claim.
3.2 Proposed Mechanism
The proposed privacy-preserving truth discovery mecha-
nism consists of the following two components:
First, we propose to add i.i.d. Gaussian noise, ξsn, to the
original data provided by the s-th user on the n-th object,
xsn. Let’s denote the perturbed information as xˆ
s
n, then
xˆsn = x
s
n + ξ
s
n, (4)
where ξsn ∼ N(0, δs2). δs2 is the variance of the Gaussian
noise chosen by the s-th user. Intuitively, the added noise is
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related to the degree of privacy protection. When noise vari-
ance is large, the added noise is more likely to be large and
more privacy protection is expected. To guarantee aggrega-
tion accuracy, we ask each user to sample his own variance
from an exponential distribution with hyper parameter λ2.
Based on this strategy, each user chooses his noise variance
independently and then sample independent noise from his
private noise distribution.
After data are perturbed, each user submits his perturbed
data {xˆsn}Nn=1 to the server. The server aggregates the per-
turbed data from all the users {xˆsn}N,Sn,s=1 by conducting truth
discovery to obtain final output for all objects. When ag-
gregating perturbed data by truth discovery, the weight of
each user is estimated based on the quality of information af-
ter perturbation. By conducting weighted aggregation, the
effect of noise will be characterized in the user weights and
the final results would not deviate much from the aggregated
results without perturbation. This promises good utility of
the aggregated results. The whole procedure is illustrated
by the following example and summarized in Algorithm 2.
Example: Consider a user who has high-quality original
data about the objects of interest. Following the proposed
mechanism, this user will sample his own variance, say a
large one, to perturb his original data. The perturbed data
is submitted to the server, and aggregated by truth discovery.
From the perspective of privacy, any other parties including
the server do not know this particular user’s original data
and his sampled variance, thus the privacy guarantee is pro-
vided. From the perspective of utility, the estimated weight
of this particular user will be low as the quality of his per-
turbed data is not good. Thus the aggregated results will not
be affected too much, and good utility can be guaranteed.
Algorithm 2 Privacy-preserving Truth Discovery
Input: N objects (i.e., micro-tasks), S users
Output: Aggregated results {xˆ∗n}Nn=1
1: Server sends micro-tasks to each user;
2: Users finish the micro-tasks, i.e., the s-th user prepares his
original information {xsn}Nn=1;
3: Each user samples his own parameter δs2 from exponential
distribution based on the server-released hyper parameter
λ2;
4: According to Eq. (4), the s-th user perturbs his original
information and get the perturbed data {xˆsn}Nn=1;
5: Users submit their perturbed data to the server;
6: Server conducts truth discovery on perturbed data
{xˆsn}N,Sn,s=1 to calculate aggregated results.
7: return Aggregated results {xˆ∗n}Nn=1.
Although the proposed mechanism is simple, it has several
nice properties which make it a great choice for user privacy
protection in truth discovery:
• First, each user chooses his noise variance indepen-
dently and randomly, so the noise distribution is un-
known to any other parties including the server.
• Second, truth discovery methods which conduct
weighted aggregation make it possible to achieve high
accuracy even when the added noise is large. This
provides better accuracy than traditional aggregation
methods, such as mean or median, which do not con-
sider user weights based on information quality.
• Last but not least, this technique ensures fast process-
ing as each user only needs to generate random noise
and add it to his data, and there are no communica-
tion costs due to the non-collaborative mechanism. It
is easy to implement and use in real practice.
4. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the pro-
posed privacy-preserving truth discovery mechanism from
utility and privacy perspectives, quantify their trade-off, and
demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve good
utility with strong privacy protection theoretically.
We first introduce the notations that will be used in the
following analysis. As the proposed privacy-preserving truth
discovery mechanism has two components, we denote the
perturbation mechanism and the truth discovery algorithm
as M and A respectively. The original data set is repre-
sented as D = {xsn}N,Sn,s=1 in which xsn is the original value
contributed by the s-th user on the n-th object. The per-
turbed data set is denoted as M(D) = {xˆsn}N,Sn,s=1 after fol-
lowingM to perturb D. The outputs of the truth discovery
algorithm on original data and perturbed data are denoted
as {x∗n}Nn=1 = A(D) and {xˆ∗n}Nn=1 = A(M(D)) in which x∗n
and xˆ∗n denote the aggregated result for the n-th object on
original data and perturbed data respectively.
We also introduce an important parameter used in the
following analysis. This parameter is related to the prior
knowledge held by the server regarding noise. As discussed
in the previous section, the noise added to the data follows
Gaussian distribution N(0, δs
2) in which δs
2 is drawn from
an exponential distribution with parameter λ2. The server
does not know the actual noise distributions, but knows the
hyper-parameter λ2. In other words, the server knows the
distribution for the variance that captures the noise distri-
butions. Formally, we define prior knowledge as follows:
Assumption 4.1 (Prior Knowledge). Prior knowl-
edge is the variance of the noise’s distributions, i.e., the p.d.f
of the noise’s variance is g(z) = λ2e
−λ2z.
Recall that in truth discovery, it is observed that the error
in the original data (difference between user input and true
aggregated results) follows Gaussian distribution N(0, σs
2).
If all the users are unreliable (with big σs
2), it is hard or
even impossible to get useful aggregated results. Thus previ-
ous work on truth discovery assumes that most users should
have relatively good quality [39]. Following this, we assume
that the error variance σs
2 is drawn from exponential distri-
bution with parameter λ1, which guarantees that the chance
of observing an unreliable user is not very large. Note that
parameter λ1 is introduced only for theoretical analysis and
is not involved in the proposed mechanism (Algorithm 2).
In practice, we do not need to estimate λ1 for a given appli-
cation.
Accordingly, the expectation of the error and noise’s vari-
ances are 1/λ1 and 1/λ2 respectively. Let 1/λ2 = c/λ1.
Then, c stands for the ratio between the expectation of
noise’s variance and that of the error’s variance. A large
c may lead to large noise added to users’ data, and thus c
can be regarded as noise level compared with original data.
c is an important parameter. In the following analysis, we
link utility and privacy to c respectively and then discuss
utility-privacy trade-off.
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4.1 Utility Analysis
In this section, we present formal definition of utility, and
analyze the utility of the proposed mechanism. First, we
define the utility as follows.
Definition 4.2 ((α, β)-Utility). Let β ∈ [0, 1] and
α ≥ 0. An algorithm A with perturbation mechanism M
satisfies (α, β)-Utility, if the following inequality holds:
Pr{|A(D)−A(M(D))| ≥ α} ≤ β, (5)
where D is an arbitrary data set. This definition quantifies
the probability of the difference in aggregation before and
after perturbation. We hope that the chance of this difference
is greater than α is smaller than probability β. Based on this
definition, under perturbation mechanism M, the smaller α
and β are, the better utility an algorithm A has.
Let A be a truth discovery approach, and M be the per-
turbation approach in the proposed mechanism. We now
quantify the utility of the proposed mechanism according to
noise level c and utility parameters α and β. The proof is
derived based on the common property held by truth dis-
covery approaches, i.e., weighted aggregation and weight es-
timation.
We derive the main result about utility shown in Theorem
4.3 when c 6= 1. The special case when c = 1 is shown with
similar results in Appendix A. We present the theorem and
proof first and then discuss this result in detail.
Theorem 4.3. Consider a truth discovery algorithm A.
We apply perturbation mechanism M stated in Algorithm 2
on a data set D and then apply truth discovery algorithm A.
Based on Assumption 4.1, for the aggregation output before
and after perturbation {x∗n}Nn=1 = A(D) and {xˆ∗n}Nn=1 =
A(M(D)), there exist constants αλ1,c and Cλ1,α,β,S, s.t.
∀α > αλ1,c, β ∈ [0, 1], and c ≤ Cλ1,α,β,S, A satisfies (α, β)-
Utility. Namely, the following inequality holds:
Pr{ 1
N
N∑
n=1
|x∗n − xˆ∗n| ≥ α} ≤ β, (6)
where Cλ1,α,β,S = λ1
√
pi(α
2βS2
4
√
2
+ α
2√pi
8
+ α + 2√
pi
) − 2 and
αλ,c =
2
√
2√
λ1(1−c) (
3
4
− c(c+
√
c+1)√
2(1+
√
c)
).
Before we give the proof of Theorem 4.3, we first introduce
a lemma that is useful to the proof.
Lemma 4.4. Assume ws = f(ts) for all s ≤ S. Provided
f is a monotonically decreasing function, then we have:∑S
s=1 wsts∑S
s=1 ws
≤
∑S
s=1 ts
S
. (7)
For the detailed proof of this lemma, please refer to Ap-
pendix B. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof.
1
N
N∑
n=1
|x∗n − xˆ∗n|
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
|
∑S
s=1 wsx
s
n∑S
s=1 ws
−
∑S
s=1 wˆsxˆ
s
n∑S
s=1 wˆs
|
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
|
∑
s′∈S wˆs′
∑S
s=1 wsx
s
n −
∑S
s=1 ws
∑
s′∈S wˆs′ xˆ
s′
n∑S
s=1 ws
∑
s′∈S wˆs′
|
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
|
∑S
s=1
∑S
s′=1 wˆs′wsx
s
n −
∑S
s=1
∑S
s′=1 wswˆs′ xˆ
s′
n∑S
s=1 ws
∑S
s′=1 wˆs′
|
≤
∑S
s=1
∑S
s′=1 wˆs′ws(
1
N
∑N
n=1 |xsn − xˆs
′
n |)∑S
s=1
∑S
s′=1 wˆs′ws
≤
∑S
s=1
∑S
s′=1(
1
N
∑N
n=1 |xsn − xˆs
′
n |)
S2
(Lemma 4.4). (8)
Note that xsn − xtruthn ∼ N(0, σ2s), xˆs
′
n − xtruthn ∼ N(0, σ2s′ +
δ2s′) where σ
2
s is the s-th user’s error variance, σ
2
s′ and δ
2
s′
are the s′-th user’s error and noise variance, and xtruthn rep-
resents the true value of the n-th object. Then xsn − xˆs
′
n ∼
N(0, σ2s +σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′), as x
s
n− xˆs
′
n = x
s
n−xtruth+xtruth− xˆs
′
n .
Denote Σ2s,s′ = σ
2
s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′ . We have:
E(|xsn − xˆs
′
n |) =
∫
R
|x| 1√
2piΣs,s′
exp{− x
2
2Σ2s,s′
}dx
= 2
∫ ∞
0
|x| 1√
2piΣs,s′
exp{− x
2
2Σ2s,s′
}dx
=
√
2
pi
√
σ2s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′ . (9)
Based on this and strong law of large numbers, we have
an almost sure convergence estimator:
1
N
N∑
n=1
|xsn − xˆs
′
n | =
√
2
pi
√
σ2s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′ . (10)
By substituting it into Eq. (8), we have:
1
N
N∑
n=1
|x∗n − xˆ∗n| ≤
√
2
pi
1
S2
S∑
s=1
S∑
s′=1
√
σ2s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′ . (11)
Denote Ys,s′ =
√
σ2s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′ , and Ys,s′ is i.i.d.
To simplify the notation, we use Y to denote Ys,s′ in
the following. Accordingly, the p.d.f. of Y is h(y) =
2
λ21λ2
λ2−λ1 y
3e−λ1y
2 − 2 λ21λ2
(λ2−λ1)2 (ye
−λ1y2 − ye−λ2y2). Thus,
E(Y ) =
√
pi( 3λ2
4
√
λ1(λ2−λ1) +
λ21−λ2
√
λ1λ2√
2λ2(λ2−λ1)2 ), and E(Y
2) =
2λ2+λ1
λ1λ2
. Based on Eq. (11), we have:
1
N
N∑
n=1
|x∗n − xˆ∗n| ≤
√
2
pi
1
S2
∑
s,s′≤S
√
σ2s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′
≤
√
2
pi
| 1
S2
∑
s,s′≤S
√
σ2s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′−E(Y )|+
√
2
pi
E(Y ).
(12)
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Based on Eq. (12), we have:
Pr{ 1
N
N∑
n=1
|x∗n − xˆ∗n| ≥ α}
≤Pr{
√
2
pi
| 1
S2
∑
s≤S
∑
s′≤S
√
σ2s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′ − E(Y )| ≥
α
2
}
+ Pr{
√
2
pi
E(Y ) ≥ α
2
} (Chebyshev’s inequality)
≤
√
2
pi
Var( 1
S2
∑
s
∑
s′ Ys,s′)
(α/2)2
+ Pr{
√
2
pi
E(Y ) ≥ α
2
}
=4
√
2
pi
1
S2
Var(Y )
(α/2)2
+ Pr{
√
2
pi
E(Y ) ≥ α
2
} ≤ β. (13)
Once the exponential distributions are given, the probability
in Eq. (13) is either 0 or 1. Note that the smaller β, the
better utility we can obtain. We can achieve Pr{
√
2
pi
E(Y ) ≥
α
2
} = 0 by assuming that α > 2
√
2√
pi
E(Y ). Thus, Eq. (13) can
be reduced to Var(Y ) ≤
√
piα2βS2
4
√
2
. Moreover,
E(Y 2) ≤
√
piα2βS2
4
√
2
+ (E(Y ))2 ≤
√
piα2βS
4
√
2
+ (
α
√
pi
2
√
2
+
√
2)2.
Since E(Y 2) = 2λ2+λ1
λ1λ2
, we have:
2λ2 + λ1
λ1λ2
≤
√
piα2βS2
4
√
2
+ (
α
√
pi
2
√
2
+
√
2)2. (14)
By substituting 1
λ2
= c 1
λ1
, we can obtain an upper bound
for c to obtain (α, β)-utility:
c ≤ λ1
√
pi(
α2βS2
4
√
2
+
α2
√
pi
8
+ α+
2√
pi
)− 2 , Cλ1,α,β,S . (15)
As
√
2
pi
E(Y ) < α
2
, we can also obtain a lower bound for
α, namely αλ,c =
2
√
2√
λ1(1−c) (
3
4
− c(c+
√
c+1)√
2(1+
√
c)
), which completes
the proof of our theorem.
This theorem reveals the relationship between the noise and
the utility for the proposed mechanism. The upper bound
of c specifies the noise level that the proposed mechanism
can afford to achieve (α, β)-utility. From the equation that
defines the upper bound of c, we can observe the following:
(1) When α and β become smaller or larger, the upper bound
of c decreases or increases, which indicates that better utility
requires smaller noise and vice versa. (2) The upper bound
of c increases with the increase in the number of users S.
This means that we can tolerate more noise when more users
contribute their information to the aggregation tasks. (3) As
λ1 captures error distributions in original data, a larger λ1
indicates better information quality and correspondingly the
mechanism can tolerate more noise.
4.2 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we analyze how noise level c is related
to user privacy. The traditional differential privacy defini-
tion provides the protection of user privacy against infor-
mation leakage through statistical query results, in which
a trusted server is assumed and thus it does not fit the
privacy-preserving truth discovery scenario. Recently, lo-
cal differential privacy [6, 8, 14] is proposed to deal with
the scenario where individual users do not trust the server.
Based on local differential privacy, we adopt the following
privacy definition to quantify the user privacy:
Definition 4.5 ((,δ)-Local Differential Privacy).
We say a mechanism M satisfies (,δ)-Local Differential
Privacy, if for any subset S ⊆ R and two different records
x1 and x2, the following inequality holds:
Pr{M(x1) ∈ S} ≤ e Pr{M(x2) ∈ S}+ δ. (16)
This definition compares the probability of observing the
perturbed value of two different records x1 and x2 in the
same range. With two distinguishable pieces of information
x1 and x2, an ideal perturbation mechanism should perturb
them to indistinguishable values to preserve user privacy in
crowdsourced data collection. As can be seen, this defini-
tion is stronger than traditional differential privacy which
compares the probability of observing similar query outputs
on two different databases with one record difference.
Next, we define sensitive information for each user and
derive its relationship to the hyper-parameter λ1 which con-
trols the error variance distribution.
Definition 4.6 (Sensitive Information). The sen-
sitive information of the s-th user is denoted by
∆s = max
x1s,x
2
s∈D
|x1s − x2s|, (17)
where x1s and x
2
s are two entries claimed by the s-th user
about the same object.
The sensitive information, ∆s, measures the range of infor-
mation claimed by the s-th user. Intuitively, ∆s is related
to λ1, as λ1 controls the variance of users’ error and large
variance (small λ1) leads to large range of values ∆s. The
following lemma formally defines their relationship.
Lemma 4.7. The p.d.f. of the errors’ variance is f(z) =
λ1e
−λ1z. The sensitive information about the s-th user, ∆s,
satisfies that ∆s = |x1s − x2s| ≤ γsλ1 with probability at least
η(1 − 2e−b
2/2
b
), where γs = b
√
2 ln 1
1−η , η and b are con-
stants.
Proof. As the s-th user’s error follows N(0, σ2s), the s-
th user’s information xs ∼ N(xtruth, σ2s) where xtruth is the
true value and σ2s is the variance drawn from the exponential
distribution with λ1. Based on the property of light tail of
exponential distribution, given a sufficient large number M ,
Pr{σ ≤M} = 1−e−λ1M2 = η, which implies M =
√
ln 1
1−η√
λ1
.
As λ1 becomes bigger, M could be smaller; vice versa. Based
on the assumption that most of the users are reliable, λ1
should be larger than 1. Consequently, M ≤
√
ln 1
1−η
λ1
.
Now, we try to bound ∆s. Let x
1
s and x
2
s be two pieces
of information claimed by the s-th user about the same
object. Thus x1s − x2s ∼ N(0, 2σ2). Based on Gaussian
Tail Inequality, we have Pr{|x1s − x2s| > b
√
2σ} ≤ 2e−b
2/2
b
,
which implies ∆s = |x1s − x2s| ≤ b
√
2σ with probability at
least 1 − 2e−b
2/2
b
. Let γs = b
√
2 ln 1
1−η . Then we have
∆s = |x1 − x2| ≤ b
√
2σ ≤ b
√
2 ln 1
1−η
λ1
= γs
λ1
with probability
at least η(1− 2e−b
2/2
b
).
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From this lemma, we can see that the sensitive informa-
tion of each user is inversely proportional to λ1, which mea-
sures the quality of users. The bigger λ1 is, the smaller
the error’s variance is and the smaller sensitive informa-
tion of the user. In the following discussion, we choose that
∆s = |x1s − x2s| =
b
√
2 ln 1
1−η
λ1
.
Next, we prove the main result of privacy analysis which
links noise level to local differential privacy under the pro-
posed mechanism.
Theorem 4.8. Consider a perturbation mechanism M
with parameter λ2, where 1/λ2 = c/λ1. Based on Defini-
tion 4.6 , M satisfies (,δ)-Local Differential Privacy in
terms of the s-th user, provided c ≥ γ2s
2λ1 ln(
1
1−δ )
, where
γs = b
√
2 ln 1
1−η .
Proof. Based on the mechanism, the s-th user draws his
noise variance from an exponential distribution with param-
eter λ2. Assume that the noise variance is y, we have:
Pr{M(x1) = x} = 1√
2piy
exp(− (x− x
1)2
2y
)
≤ 1√
2piy
exp(− (x− x
2)2 − (x2 − x1)2
2y
)
= exp(
(x2 − x1)2
2y
)
1√
2piy
exp(− (x− x
2)2
2y
)
≤ exp(∆
2
s
2y
) Pr{M(x2) = x} ≤ e Pr{M(x2) = x}. (18)
Obviously, Pr{M(x1) = x} ≤ e Pr{M(x2) = x}, if and
only if y ≥ ∆2s
2
. Since y follows exponential distribution with
parameter λ2, we constrain that the event {y : y ≥ ∆
2
s
2
}
happens with at least 1 − δ probability. Namely, Pr({y :
y ≥ ∆2s
2
}) ≥ 1 − δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, Pr({y : y ≥
∆2s
2
}) = exp(−λ2∆2s
2
) ≥ 1− δ. Then, λ2∆2s
2
≤ ln( 1
1−δ ). Since
1
λ2
= c 1
λ1
, we have c ≥ λ1∆2s
2 ln( 1
1−δ )
. Based on Lemma 4.7, we
have c ≥ γ2s
2λ1 ln(
1
1−δ )
, where γs = b
√
2 ln 1
1−η .
Note that the domain of noise variance is R+. Let us
divide R+ as R+ = R1 ∪ R2, where R1 = {ρ2 ∈ R+ : ρ2 ≥
∆2s
2
} and R2 = {ρ2 ∈ R+ : ρ2 < ∆
2
s
2
}. Denote M(x, ρ2) as
the mechanism M adding noise N(0, ρ2) to the record x.
Let S ⊆ R be given. We adopt the idea used in Gaussian
mechanism [8] to build two different subsets of S, i.e., S1 and
S2, in the following way. For a specific output M(x, ρ2) ∈
S, we claim M(x, ρ2) ∈ S1 if ρ2 ∈ R1 or M(x, ρ2) ∈ S2
if ρ2 ∈ R2. Therefore, the probability of event M(x, ρ2)
belonging to S1 equals to that of event ρ2 belonging to R1.
Similar relation holds between the eventM(x, ρ2) ∈ S2 and
the event ρ2 ∈ R2.
Thus, we have
Pr
ρ2∈R+
{M(x1, ρ2) ∈ S} ≤ ( Pr
ρ2∈R1
+ Pr
ρ2∈R2
){M(x1, ρ2) ∈ S2}
≤ Pr
ρ2∈R1
{M(x1, ρ2) ∈ S1}+ δ
≤ e( Pr
ρ2∈R+
{M(x2, ρ2) ∈ S}) + δ
yielding (, δ)-local differential privacy for the proposed per-
turbation mechanism M.
From Theorem 4.8, we can conclude that to achieve
stronger privacy, namely for smaller , the noise level c has
to be greater than a certain threshold. This is consistent
with intuitions that more noise leads to stronger privacy
protection. The lower bound of c is related to λ1 and pri-
vacy parameters  and δ. Smaller  and δ (stronger privacy
protection) ask for a bigger bound for the noise level. The
bigger λ1, the smaller the variance of users’ error, and thus
less noise is required to guarantee privacy. Since the mecha-
nism of generating perturbed data is the same across users,
Theorem 4.8 is applicable to each individual user.
4.3 Utility-Privacy Trade-off
Based on Theorem 4.3 (utility) and Theorem 4.8 (pri-
vacy), we can now analyze the trade-off between utility and
privacy as shown in the following theorem:
Theorem 4.9. (Utility Privacy Trade-off) Consider a
truth discovery algorithm A with perturbation mechanism
M and an input data set D. Based on Assumption 4.1
and Definition 4.6, ∀α > 2
√
2√
λ1(1−c) (
3
4
− c(c+
√
c+1)√
2(1+
√
c)
), the al-
gorithm A with perturbation mechanism M satisfies (α, β)-
Utility and (, δ)-Local Differential Privacy, provided c ≤
λ1
√
pi(α
2βS2
4
√
2
+ α
2√pi
8
+ α + 2√
pi
) − 2 and c ≥ γ2s
2λ1 ln(
1
1−δ )
,
where γs = b
√
2 ln 1
1−η .
Proof. Based on the Theorem 4.3 and 4.8, Theorem 4.9
holds immediately.
Theorem 4.9 provides a guideline on how to choose a
proper c to achieve the trade-off between utility and pri-
vacy. To have a valid c, we must have the upper bound of
c derived from utility analysis to be greater than or equal
to the lower bound of c derived from privacy analysis. Es-
pecially, to have at least one c exist, the two bounds should
be the same, and thus we have:
λ1
√
pi(
α2βS2
4
√
2
+
α2
√
pi
8
+α+
2√
pi
)−2 = γ
2
s
2λ1 ln(
1
1−δ )
. (19)
It is obvious that stronger privacy (smaller  and δ) can
be satisfied when sacrificing utility (increase in α and β),
and better utility can be achieved when privacy is com-
prised. This trade-off is related to the characteristics of
data, i.e., the error distribution in the original data, which
is controlled by hyper-parameter λ1. A larger λ1 indicates
a higher chance that users’ original information is similar
enough, and thus strong privacy and good utility are pos-
sible. Similarly, a smaller λ1 leads to more challenging pri-
vacy protection in which less privacy and utility gain are
expected. In the following section, we will experimentally
verify this trade-off.
5. EXPERIMENT
In the previous section, we quantified the trade-off be-
tween the utility of aggregated results and the privacy of
users. Now, we illustrate this result via a set of experiments:
(1) We demonstrate how the proposed mechanism achieves
good privacy and utility on simulated datasets, and evaluate
the performance under different scenarios. (2) The privacy
and utility trade-off is further demonstrated on a real crowd
sensing system. We also demonstrate how good utility is
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achieved by the proposed mechanism which can automati-
cally assign user weights based on information quality. (3)
We show that the proposed method is scalable to large-scale
data by conducting efficiency tests.
5.1 Experiments on Synthetic Dataset
In this part, we show experimental results on synthetic
datasets. As mentioned in Section 3, the error made by each
individual user can be captured by a normal distribution
N(0, σs
2), where the variance indicates the quality of his
information. Therefore, we simulate 150 users with various
qualities by setting different σs
2, and generate their provided
information for 30 objects based on both the ground truth
information and the sampled error. We regard this dataset
as the original data contributed by the users.
For each individual user, we follow Algorithm 2 to perturb
his information. Specifically, we choose a hyper-parameter
λ2, and generate each user’s noise parameter δs
2 from expo-
nential function with λ2. Then each user’s data is perturbed
by injecting sampled random noise based on Gaussian dis-
tribution with δs
2 as variance. We then conduct truth dis-
covery on the perturbed data.
To measure the utility of aggregation, we compare the ag-
gregated results based on original data and perturbed data,
and quantify their difference. Here, we adopt the commonly
used L1-norm distance, i.e., the mean of absolute distance
(MAE) on all objects. For this measure, lower value indi-
cates better utility.
Note that the privacy parameter  is defined in a differ-
ent way compared with traditional differential privacy. As
shown in Definition 4.5, the same  in local differential pri-
vacy indicates stronger privacy protection as the definition
is based on the perturbation of one record. Nonetheless, we
can still observe low  in the following experiments.
Utility-Privacy Trade-off. Figure 2 plots the utility-privacy
trade-off on the synthetic dataset. Figure 2a shows the
trade-off in terms of privacy parameters  and MAE. To
provide some intuition about how much noise the approach
can tolerate, we show the average noise level corresponding
to different  in Figure 2b. We can see that in order to guar-
antee stronger privacy (smaller ), larger noise is needed.
However, the added large noise only incurs small loss in util-
ity. From Figure 2a, we can observe that the utility changes
very slowly and the magnitude is quite small compared with
the added noise. To facilitate comparison, we use the same
x-axis and make the scale of y-axis the same for these plots.
As can be seen, when the average of added noise reaches
closer to 1, the average loss in utility is less than 0.1 (only
1/10 of the noise). This demonstrates the advantage of the
proposed mechanism in maintaining good utility even when
high noise is added.
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Figure 2: Utility-Privacy Trade-off on Synthetic Dataset
Effect of λ1. In Theorem 4.9, we show that λ1 is related to
both utility and privacy and here we demonstrate its effect
empirically. λ1 captures the information quality distribution
of original data. As shown in Figure 3b, when λ1 is big, the
variance of the distribution used to sample noise variance is
small, so the quality of all users are relatively good. Then
users tend to contribute similar information for the same
object, so small noise can hide users’ information. On the
other hand, when λ1 is small, user-provided information may
be quite different due to the low quality controlled by the
error distribution, and thus only large noise can preserve
their privacy. Figure 3a demonstrates utility variation under
different λ1. With small λ1, large noise has to be added so
the utility will be affected more. The message we can get
is that it is easier to maintain both privacy and utility if
the original data has high quality and it is more challenging
when the original data is noisy.
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Figure 3: Effect of λ1 (Parameter of Error Distribution in
Original Data)
Effect of S. Next, we study the effect of S, i.e., the num-
ber of users that are involved in the aggregation task. In
the proposed mechanism, all users act independently to add
noise and they do not rely on each other. Hence the aver-
age noise will not be affected by the number of users. This
phenomenon is demonstrated in Figure 4b in which the av-
erage of added noise keeps the same as S increases. On the
other hand, Figure 4a shows that having more users can
help utility. The reason is that truth discovery approaches
can estimate user weights better when more information is
collected, and thus obtain better aggregation results. This
is consistent with our theoretical analysis on utility in Theo-
rem 4.3: To achieve the same level of utility, we can tolerate
larger noise if more users are involved in the task.
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Figure 4: Effect of S (Number of Users)
Truth Discovery Methods. As discussed in Algorithm 2, this
mechanism can work with any specific method that satisfies
the general principle of truth discovery. In the experiments
shown so far, we adopt the recent CRH [19] method. Here
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we present results on a different truth discovery method to
illustrate the mechanism’s ability to generalize to other ap-
proaches. We apply another start-of-the-art truth discovery
approach that can be applied to continuous data, GTM [38],
and show the results in Figure 5. The patterns of utility pri-
vacy trade-off are similar compared to those based on CRH.
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Figure 5: Utility-Privacy Trade-off on Synthetic Dataset
(GTM)
5.2 Experiments on Crowd Sensing Applica-
tion
In this section, we show experimental results on a real
world crowd sensing application to illustrate the effective-
ness of the proposed mechanism. The application is indoor
floorplan construction [31, 11], which has gained growing
interest as many location-based services are built upon this
task. The goal is to automatically construct indoor floorplan
from sensor data collected from smartphone users. How-
ever, since the private personal activities of the phone users
are usually encoded in the sensor readings, the users may
not willing to share their data without privacy protection
guarantee. Here we focus on one task of indoor floorplan
construction: Estimate the distance between two location
points along a straight hallway by aggregating user data.
Specifically, we select 129 hallway segments as the objects
and collect data from 247 smartphone users via a developed
Android app. We then obtain the distance each user has
traveled on each hallway segment by multiplying user step
size by step count. Due to different walking patterns and
in-phone sensor quality, the distances obtained by differ-
ent users on the same segment can be quite different. The
goal is to derive the true length of hallways by aggregating
user-provided distance information. We let each user add
noise to their original information following the procedure
in Algorithm 2. We vary the hyper parameter λ2 to col-
lect multiple sets of perturbed data, and the truth discovery
method adopted here is still CRH.
Utility-Privacy Trade-off. We still adopt MAE to measure
aggregation utility. Figure 6 shows the utility and privacy
trade-off. Compared with Figure 2, we observe the same
pattern that is shown on synthetic data. This confirms that
even when the added noise is quite large (strong privacy),
good utility can be achieved under the proposed mechanism.
Weight Comparison. As discussed, the advantage of the
proposed privacy-preserving truth discovery mechanism in
preserving good utility can be attributed to the weight esti-
mation scheme. We illustrate this fact on the indoor floor-
plan dataset by comparing weights estimated from original
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Figure 6: Utility-Privacy Trade-off on Indoor Floorplan
Dataset
and perturbed data. Figure 7 shows the estimated weights
for 7 randomly selected users by the proposed method on
original data and perturbed data using blue dotted lines.
We obtain the groundtruth distance by measuring the hall-
way segments manually. This enables us to derive the true
weight of each user for both cases, which are shown as black
solid curves. By comparing true and estimated weights, we
can observe the following phenomena: (1) The weights esti-
mated by the proposed method are mostly consistent with
the true weights, and thus weighted aggregation can outper-
form naive aggregation solutions such as mean or median in
finding true information. (2) Compared with information
quality on original data (Figure 7a), we find that the 5-th
user adds large noise to protect his information, and thus
on perturbed data, his weight is adjusted to a smaller value.
This shows how the proposed mechanism can assign user
weights based on user information quality, as explained in
Section 3. Correspondingly, the effect of added noise can be
reduced during weighted aggregation, and thus aggregated
result does not deviate much from the result before pertur-
bation.
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Figure 7: Weight Comparison
5.3 Efficiency
The last experiment shows the efficiency of the proposed
mechanism. According to Algorithm 2, the running time
mainly comes from the execution of two parts, data pertur-
bation and truth discovery procedure. Compared with time
complexity of truth discovery, the time to add random noise
is negligible, so we focus on analyzing the running time of
truth discovery when different noise level is adopted.
Truth discovery is an iterative procedure whose running
time is controlled by the number of iterations needed to
achieve convergence. Existing literature has demonstrated
that the running time of truth discovery increases linearly
with respect to the number of objects [19] when the number
of iterations is fixed, which is highly efficient. Therefore, in
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this experiment, we test the effect of noise level on running
time, i.e., we check if the number of iterations is affected
by noise level which leads to changes in running time. In
practice, we set the convergence criterion for truth discovery
in the following way: If the change in aggregated results is
smaller than a threshold, the algorithm is terminated. We
set the same threshold, vary the added noise, and record the
running time of truth discovery on original and perturbed
data. Figure 8 reports the results in which the solid red
line shows the running time of truth discovery on original
data, and blue dots represent the running time on data with
certain added noise. We can observe that running time after
perturbation is slightly bigger than that on original data,
but the running time does not change much when noise level
varies. This shows that perturbation on user data does not
change the running time of truth discovery approach, which
guarantees practical deployment of the proposed mechanism
on large-scale crowdsourcing applications.
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Figure 8: Efficiency Study
6. RELATED WORK
Truth discovery has emerged as a hot topic for conflict
resolution in data integration, and been applied in many
other domains [32, 25, 21]. By estimating source (user)
quality from the data, the aggregated results are more re-
liable compared with naive solutions such as voting or av-
eraging. Existing approaches include TruthFinder [35], Ac-
cuSim [20], CRH [19], etc. However, all these truth discov-
ery approaches do not address the privacy concern in data
collection. There are some recent work [26, 33, 27, 41, 40]
which deal with this privacy concern based on encryption
or secure multi-party computation techniques. Compared
to them, the proposed mechanism in this paper provides a
much more efficient perturbation based solution to privacy-
preserving truth discovery.
Differential privacy [7, 18, 28, 4, 9, 2, 24, 12, 36] is a quan-
tified privacy definition for protecting sensitive information
that needs to be released, and it balances the trade-off be-
tween privacy protection and utility loss. Among the related
work of differential privacy, distributed differential privacy
[16, 3] shares some similarity with our work, and it enables
individual information sources to add noise separately. How-
ever, in distributed differential privacy, the server is still
assumed to be trusted and the protection is against infor-
mation leakage to third parties via statistical queries. Hence
their setting is different from the one in this paper. Another
relevant topic is local differential privacy [6, 8, 14] which
deals with the scenario that users do not trust the server.
In privacy analysis, we quantify the user privacy based on
local differential privacy.
Among the related work on privacy-preserving data aggre-
gation, some provide users with secure protocols that allow
users to submit their sensitive information to a collector [15,
26, 33, 27, 41, 40]. However, these methods are mainly based
on encryption or secure multi-party computation, which re-
quires expensive computation or communication. Therefore,
none of them is an ideal solution to privacy-preserving truth
discovery which usually involves a large number of users and
thus requires efficient strategies.
On the other hand, some related work on privacy-
preserving data aggregation are perturbation-based. These
methods are designed for the computation of some statistics
[10, 37]. They are not designed for truth discovery that au-
tomatically infers user weights from the data and conducts
weighted aggregation. Thus these methods cannot be easily
applied to privacy-preserving truth discovery.
Note that the aforementioned privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation approaches deal with tasks that are different from
truth discovery. Truth discovery automatically estimates
user weights from the data and incorporates such weights in
the truth computation. The iterative procedure of weight
estimation and weighted aggregation steps in truth discov-
ery make it quite different from other aggregation methods.
Therefore, the proposed privacy-preserving truth discovery
mechanism and analysis, which capture the unique charac-
teristics of truth discovery task, differ from those in related
work. The most relevant existing work is [23], in which a
privacy-preserving mechanism is proposed for truth discov-
ery with categorical data, while in the paper, the proposed
mechanism is for truth discovery with continuous data.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In order to extract reliable information from noisy crowd-
sourced sensory data, it is crucial to estimate the quality of
individual users. Truth discovery, in which the reliable in-
formation and user weights are inferred simultaneously, pro-
vides a nice way to mine such noisy sensory data. However,
existing truth discovery methods fail to address the user
privacy issue that arises in the data collection procedure.
In this paper, we propose a perturbation-based privacy-
preserving truth discovery mechanism for crowd sensing sys-
tems. This mechanism is efficient and does not require any
communication or coordination among mobile device users.
In this mechanism, each user samples a variance parame-
ter δs
2 from an exponential distribution and draws random
noise from a Gaussian distribution with δs
2 variance to per-
turb his data. After collecting perturbed data, the server
conducts weighted aggregation for final output. As user
weights can capture the information quality, the aggregated
results on perturbed data do not differ much from the orig-
inal aggregated values even when big noise is added. We
further analyze the performance of the proposed mechanism
theoretically. We formally define (α, β)-utility and (, δ)-
privacy, and connect these concepts to the noise level c. The
derived theorems show that larger noise leads to stronger
privacy protection with less utility and vice versa. We con-
duct experiments on not only synthetic datasets but also a
crowdsourced indoor floorplan construction system. Results
show that the proposed privacy-preserving truth discovery
mechanism can tolerate big noise while the aggregation ac-
curacy only drops slightly, which implies the guarantee of
both good utility and strong privacy.
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APPENDIX
A. SPECIAL CASE
For the special case where c = 1, we have the following
result in term of utility.
Theorem A.1. Let c = 1, ∀α > 15
√
2λ1
8
,
lim
S→∞
Pr{ 1
N
N∑
n=1
|x∗n − xˆ∗n| ≥ α} = 0. (20)
Proof. When c = 1, the distribution of noise variance is
the same as the distribution of the error variance. Therefore,
Y 2s,s′ = σ
2
s + σ
2
s′ + δ
2
s′ follows Gamma(3, 1/λ1), with p.d.f.
h(y) = 1
2
λ31y
2e−λ1y. It is easy to derive the p.d.f of Ys,s′ ,
which is h′(y) = λ31y
5e−λ1y
2
. Moreover, E(Y ) = 15
16
√
λ1pi
and E(Y 2) = 3
λ1
.
Similar to the proof for Theorem 4.3, we have
Pr{ 1
N
N∑
n=1
|x∗n − xˆ∗n| ≥ α} ≤ 4
√
2
pi
1
S2
Var(Y )
(α/2)2
= 4
√
2
pi
1
S2
(E(Y 2)− E2(Y ))
(α/2)2
=
√
2
pi
48− 12λ21pi
S2α2λ1
. (21)
As S goes to infinity, the right hand side tends to 0. There-
fore, ∀α > 15
√
2λ1
8
, we have limS→∞ Pr{ 1N
∑N
n=1 |x∗n− xˆ∗n| ≥
α} = 0. Thus Theorem A.1 holds.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 4.4
Proof. To prove Eq. (7) is equivalent to prove the fol-
lowing inequality:
S
S∑
s=1
wsts ≤
S∑
s=1
ts
S∑
s′=1
ws′ . (22)
Moreover, we have:
S
S∑
s=1
wsts −
S∑
s=1
ts
S∑
s′=1
ws′
= S
S∑
s=1
wsts −
S∑
s=1
S∑
s′=1
tsws′
= (S − 1)
S∑
s=1
wsts −
S∑
s=1
S∑
s′ 6=s
tsws′
=
dS−1
2
e∑
s=1
∑
s′≤s
(f(ts)− f(ts′ ))(ts − ts′ ).
According to the condition that f is a monotonically de-
creasing function , we can obtain:
f(ts)− f(ts′) =
{ ≥ 0 if ts − ts′ ≤ 0
≤ 0 if ts − ts′ ≥ 0
It is obvious to see that for all s and s′, if s 6= s′, the
following inequality holds:
(f(ts)− f(ts′))(ts − ts′) ≤ 0. (23)
Based on this observation,
∑dS−1
2
e
s=1
∑
s′≤s(f(ts) −
f(ts′))(ts − ts′) ≤ 0, which proves Eq. (7). Therefore,
Lemma 4.4 holds.
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